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ABSTRACT 
The Effects of Disclosure Regulation on Innovative Firms:  Common Values* 
by Jos Jansen 
Firms in an R&D race actively manage rivals' beliefs by disclosing and concealing 
information on their cost of investment. The firms' disclosure strategies affect their 
incentives to invest in R&D, and to acquire information. We compare equilibria under 
voluntary disclosure with those under mandated disclosure in a model with perfect 
positive correlation among the firms' cost of investment.  Under voluntary disclosure 
firms disclose bad news, and conceal good news to discourage their rival. Under 
mandatory disclosure firms typically expect higher profits for given information 
acquisition investments, but they acquire less information. 
 
Keywords: R&D competition, information acquisition, disclosure regulation 
JEL Classification: D83, L23, O31, O32 
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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Wirkung von Offenlegungsvorschriften auf innovative Firmen:  Perfekt 
korrelierte Werte 
Unternehmen, welche an einem F&E -Wettbewerb teilnehmen, managen  aktiv die 
Erwartungen ihrer Konkurrenten, indem sie gezielt entscheiden, ob sie Informationen 
über ihre Investitionskosten veröffentlichen oder geheim halten. Durch ihre 
Offenlegungsstrategien beeinflussen sie sowohl die Anreize Ihrer Konkurrenten, 
Informationen zu sammeln, wie auch deren Anreize, F&E zu betreiben. Anhand eines 
Modells mit vollständig positiver Korrelation zwischen den Investitionskosten der 
Unternehmen vergleicht der Beitrag Gleichgewichte in denen die Unternehmen 
freiwillig wählen, ob sie ihre Informationen offen legen wollen, mit den 
Gleichgewichten, bei denen Unternehmen ihre Information offen legen müssen. Bei 
freiwilliger Offenlegung veröffentlichen Unternehmen schlechte Nachrichten und 
behalten gute für sich, um Mitbewerber zu entmutigen. Bei Offenlegungspflicht 
erwarten Unternehmen typischerweise höhere Gewinne für vorgegebene Investitionen 
in Informationskosten, aber sie beschaffen sich weniger Information. 
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1 Introduction
A basic property of research and development (R&D) is that it generates information
for the firms that invest in it. Usually this information is private to the firms and
is acquired at a cost. Disclosure or concealment of such intermediate information by
competing research labs can have conflicting eﬀects on R&D competition. It is there-
fore not obvious what incentives firms have to disclose information, and consequently
how much firms want to invest in the acquisition of information. This paper, and
companion paper Jansen (2001b), discusses what disclosure incentives the firms have,
and what eﬀects disclosure regulation has on investments and profits.
For some innovations firms aggressively preannounce their new products to dis-
courage rivals. For example, in the operating system market many people claim that
Microsoft (MS) is using preannouncements of its operating system upgrades to drive
competition out of their market.1 Disclosing good news about MS’s capabilities of
introducing a new product in the market quickly, discourages rivals to invest in devel-
oping competing products. The progress of one firm in the race gives the leading firm
a strategic advantage, which discourages its rivals to invest in the innovation, e.g. see
Grossman and Shapiro (1987), and Harris and Vickers (1987). This is a “strategic
eﬀect”. If firms can disclose that they made an early intermediate discovery without
revealing the contents of their discovery, they would do so. Disclosing good news
and concealing bad news makes your rival believe that he is facing a strong R&D
competitor, which discourages him.
In other industries we can observe an eﬀect of intermediate information disclo-
sure that conflicts with the strategic eﬀect. For fundamental innovations, for which
firms do not have a clear idea of their costs of investment, disclosure of intermediate
successes can encourage rival firms to invest. An example of this type of behavior is
provided by the responses to major breakthroughs in the development of cold super-
conductivity and biotechnology.2 Here one firm’s intermediate success gives not only
an indication of this firm’s capabilities of developing the new product, but also of that
of its rivals. Good news for one firm is good news for the whole industry. Then news
1See e.g. Lopatka and Page (1995), Prentice (1996), Shapiro (1996), United States v. Microsoft,
Civil Action No. 94-1564, and Shapiro and Varian (1999). An extensive anacdotical report on
Microsoft’s strategies is presented in Wallace and Erickson (1992).
2The example of superconductivity is discussed by Choi (1991). For the biotech industry Austin
(1993) claims that: “about one-third of the excess return for a WSJ patent (...) may be due to
the market’s revising upward its valuations of all (non-rival) biotechnology firms in the wake of one
firm’s good patent news.”
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on the R&D progress by one firm makes all firms more optimistic, and more willing
to invest. This is an “informational eﬀect”. But when favorable information for one
firm also encourages rivals to invest in the project, the firm might want to prevent
its rivals from learning this information. Firms would conceal good news about their
research progress, and disclose only bad news. Concealing good news and disclosing
bad news makes your rivals believe that the industry has high costs of investment,
which discourages their investments.
Note that the strategic and informational eﬀect lead to conflicting incentives to
disclose information about one’s costs of investment. We study the interaction between
the two eﬀects in this paper. R&D races are typically contests in which firms learn.
Information is actively and endogenously acquired in R&D races. Information need
not always flow freely between firms. In many situations firms actively manage the flow
of information that they generate. This adds a new dimension to the firms’ strategies.
The main contribution of this paper is that it provides a theory on firms’ incentives to
strategically disclose acquired information to rivals. We analyze the trade-oﬀ between
the incentives to acquire, disclose and further build upon information in an R&D
race. As far as I know this has never been done in the literature. Furthermore
we discuss the consequences of disclosure regulation. We distinguish between the
policy of mandatory and voluntary disclosure, and study their consequences for firms’
investments and expected profits.
When correlation between firms’ costs of investments is positive, both the informa-
tional and strategic eﬀect emerge after disclosure of information. For perfect positive
correlation between costs of investments we show that the informational eﬀect dom-
inates the strategic eﬀect in most cases. Firms disclose bad news, and conceal good
news to make their rival as pessimistic about costs of investment as possible. There
are, however, also special cases in which the strategic eﬀect is more powerful.
The companion paper Jansen (2001b) analyzes the model with independently dis-
tributed costs of investment, and studies the consequences of disclosure regulation
for investments and profits. With independent costs the informational eﬀect disap-
pears, while the strategic eﬀect remains. Disclosure of good news and concealment
of bad news makes rivals expect strong R&D competitors, without aﬀecting their
cost expectations. Note that the firms’ equilibrium disclosure rule under indepen-
dently distributed costs is typically exactly the opposite of that under perfect positive
correlation.
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Related literature: Contests in which firms learn after investing are studied by
Hendricks and Kovenock (1989), Choi (1991). These papers assume that information
flows freely between competing firms. We show in this paper whether full information
disclosure is compatible with the firms incentives, and whether it is desirable for firms.
Recent papers, such as Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998), Gosálbez and Díez (2000),
and Rosenkranz (2001), study information disclosure incentives in research joint ven-
tures. Although these studies provide valuable insights in the incentives for informa-
tion disclosure by innovative firms, they focus on the eﬀects of cooperation between
firms. We study the incentives to disclose information in a competitive setting, and
focus on the eﬀects of disclosure regulation.
A powerful result in the theory of strategic disclosure of verifiable information is
the “unraveling result”. Seminal contributions by Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981),
Milgrom and Roberts (1986), and Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) study this result.
When it is known that the sender of information is informed, and information is
costlessly verifiable, he cannot do better than disclose his information, given skep-
tical equilibrium beliefs of the receiver. This result relies on the assumptions that
information is costlessly verifiable and that it is known that the sender is informed.
Uncertainty about whether or not the sender is informed and non-verifiability of un-
informedness disables the unraveling result in most cases. Austen-Smith (1994) shows
that when the receiver is uncertain about the informedness of the sender, the sender
can conceal some of his information in equilibrium. In equilibrium good news is dis-
closed while bad news is concealed from the receiver. This argument is generalized
and refined by Shin (1994). Krishnan et al. (1996) provide empirical evidence that
firms partially disclose earnings information to the financial market. We will use a
similar framework of uncertain informedness to study strategic disclosure by racing
R&D laboratories.
The incentives to acquire and disclose information have been studied in firm-
financial market (see Verecchia, 1990), buyer-seller (see Shavell, 1994) and lobbyist-
government (see Lagerlöf, 1997) settings. These papers endogenize the degree of
informedness of the sender, but abstract from competition between senders. Papers
in which firms strategically disclose information under competition are Admati and
Pfleiderer (2000), Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), and Shin (1998). The setup of these
papers, however, is such that senders disclose or conceal information to a third party.
Both Shavell (1994) and Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) are interested in the eﬀects of
disclosure regulation. This is a main theme of this paper too. While Shavell (1994)
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studies a model with endogenous information acquisition, but ignores the eﬀects of
competition, Admati and Pfleiderer study the eﬀects of competition with exogenous
information. This paper studies the eﬀects of disclosure regulation on R&D competi-
tion and information acquisition.
Our main contribution to the literature is to give an overall analysis of the inter-
action between incentives for strategic information acquisition, disclosure, and subse-
quent R&D investment. Information is endogenous in two respects: first, firms invest
in the acquisition of information, and, second, firms strategically manage information
disclosure.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the model. In
the third section we characterize the benchmark outcome in which firms maximize
joint profits. Section 4 gives the equilibrium strategies of the game for mandatory
disclosure, and compares these equilibrium strategies with those in the benchmark.
The fifth section discusses the equilibrium investments and disclosure rules when firms
voluntarily disclose information, and compares these investments with those under
mandated disclosure. In section 6 we perform an overall expected profit comparison
between mandated and voluntary disclosure equilibria. Finally, section 7 discusses the
results, and section 8 concludes the paper. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
Two firms use similar techniques to obtain the innovation. Therefore the firms’ costs
of R&D investment are perfectly positively correlated. At the beginning of the race
firms do not know their cost of investment θ. The firms have either low or high costs
of investment, i.e. θ ∈ {θ, θ} with 0 < θ < θ. The probability of investing in a project
with low (resp. high) cost is p (resp. 1− p), with 0 < p < 1.
Firms can learn about the cost of R&D investment by acquiring information in
the first stage of the race. In this stage firms choose their information acquisition
investments, Ri ∈ [0, 1] for firm i, simultaneously. Information acquisition investments
are not observable. Firm i’s rival expects investments ri of firm i. Costs of information
acquisition are strictly convex and increasing in investment: c(Ri) = 12ρR
2
i , with ρ > 0
for i = 1, 2. After investing in information acquisition each firm receives a signal, Θi
for firm i, about its cost of R&D investment. With probability Ri firm i learns its true
cost of investment, Θi = θ. However, with probability 1 − Ri firm i learns nothing,
Θi = ∅. Hence the more a firm invests in information acquisition, the more likely it
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is that the firm will be informed. The information acquisition stage is summarized in
figure 1 below.
Θi = ∅
Θi = θ
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Figure 1: Firm i’s information acquisition stage
The information that firms acquire is verifiable. However, the fact whether or not
a firm is informed is not verifiable. If firm i receives information θ, it can choose to
either disclose or conceal this, i.e. the firm chooses its communication δi(θ) from the
set {θ,∅}. An uninformed firm can only state δi(∅) = ∅. It therefore suﬃces to
denote firm i’s disclosure rule as (δi(θ), δi(θ)). We denote the realization of rule δi(.)
as δ∗i , with δ
∗
i ∈ {δi(Θi)|Θi ∈ {θ, θ,∅}}. That is, δ∗i is the message from firm i to j,
for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j
In the second stage firms invest in developing their innovation by investing Di ∈
[0, 1] for firm i. Costs of R&D investment increase in investment and cost parameter
θ: C(Di; θ) = 12θD
2
i . With probability Di firm i invents a product, with probability
1 − Di it invents nothing. In this paper we study a “winner-take-all” race. A firm
gets payoﬀ W , when it is the only firm that invents. When both firms are successful,
both firms receive payoﬀ T . When a firm does not invent a new product, it gets no
payoﬀ. Naturally, we take W ≥ 2T ≥ 0. Define ∆ ≡ W − T as the prize diﬀerence
between winning and tying in the race. Because T is non-negative and cannot exceed
1
2
W , we obtain that 1
2
W ≤ ∆ ≤ W . For convenience we assume that θ > 2∆, since
this enables us to focus on interior R&D investment solutions.
Firms are risk-neutral. Given the cost of investment θ, and sunk costs of informa-
tion acquisition investments, firm i’s expected R&D profit is:
πi(D; θ) = Di(1−Dj)W +DiDjT −
1
2
θD2i = Di(W −Dj∆)−
1
2
θD2i , (2.1)
with D = (Di,Dj). We solve the game backwards, and restrict the analysis to sym-
metric, pure strategy equilibria.
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3 Benchmark: Joint-Profit-Maximization
In this section we solve for the joint-profit-maximizing outcome of the race. Note that
for joint profits full disclosure is never worse than any other disclosure rule – firms can
always choose to ignore certain disclosed information. It is therefore optimal to take
δi(Θi) ≡ Θi for i = 1, 2. First we derive the joint-profit-maximizing R&D investments
for any given combination of information acquisition investments. Second we analyze
the information acquisition investments that maximize joint profits.
3.1 Joint-Profit-Maximizing R&D
In this subsection we derive the joint-profit-maximizing R&D investments, given full
information disclosure and any information acquisition investments.
Since the costs of R&D investment are perfectly positively correlated, firms learn
about their own cost of investment from their own acquired signal, and from disclosed
information by their rival. We distinguish two cases. The first case is one in which
firms invest under complete information. Whenever one of the firms receives an infor-
mative signal, both firms are fully informed about their cost of investment. For firms
with cost θ we denote this case by Θ = θ. Formally we have:
Θ = θ, if (Θi,Θj) ∈ {(θ, θ), (θ,∅), (∅, θ)}, for θ ∈ {θ, θ}. (3.1)
Second, there is the no-information case, denoted by Θ = ∅, if (Θi,Θj) = (∅,∅). In
this case firms cannot update beliefs about R&D costs, and maximize joint ex ante
profits. The expected cost parameter is:
θE(Θ) =
½
θ, if Θ = θ, for θ ∈ {θ, θ}, and
E(θ) ≡ pθ + (1− p)θ, if Θ = ∅. . (3.2)
Total expected R&D profit, given case Θ, is:
Eθ
(
2X
`=1
π`(D; θ)
¯¯¯¯
¯Θ
)
=W
2X
`=1
D` − 2∆DiDj −
1
2
θE(Θ)
2X
`=1
D2` . (3.3)
Maximizing this profit with respect to Di gives the following R&D investment, Di for
firm i:
Di(Θ) =
W
θE(Θ) + 2∆
, for i = 1, 2. (3.4)
Note that the firms’ R&D investments decrease in their expected cost parameter
θE(Θ). The more pessimistic firms are about their costs of investment the less they
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invest in obtaining the innovation. Firm i’s maximum expected R&D profit is as
follows:
πi(Θ) ≡ Eθ
¡
πi(D; θ) |Θ
¢
=
1
2
WDi(Θ), for i = 1, 2. (3.5)
3.2 Joint-Profit-Maximizing Information Acquisition
In the first stage of the race firms choose information acquisition investments. By do-
ing so, they choose the probability of getting informed about their cost of R&D invest-
ment. The total expected profit, given information acquisition investments (Ri, Rj),
and R&D investments (Di, Dj), is:
2X
`=1
Π`(Ri, Rj) = [1− (1−Ri)(1−Rj)]
2X
`=1
E {π`(θ)}+
+(1−Ri)(1−Rj)
2X
`=1
π`(∅)−
1
2
ρ
2X
`=1
R2` . (3.6)
First assume that it maximizes total profits to have only firm i acquiring information.
Joint profit maximization results in first-order condition: ρRi ≤ Ψ, where:
Ψ ≡
2X
`=1
[E{π`(θ)}− π`(∅)] = E
½
W 2
θ + 2∆
¾
− W
2
E(θ) + 2∆
, (3.7)
and Ψ > 0.3. This first-order condition is suﬃcient for all 0 < ρ < Ψ, which gives
joint-profit-maximizing investment Ri = 1. For ρ ≥ Ψ total profits are maximized
when both firms invest in information acquisition. Maximization with respect to
Ri gives first-order condition ρRi = (1 − Rj)Ψ. Joint-profit-maximizing information
acquisition investments are determined by the trade-oﬀ between the marginal cost
of investment, ρRi, and the expected marginal revenue of becoming informed. This
marginal revenue is the total expected profit added to the industry from becoming
informed instead of remaining uninformed. The joint-profit-maximizing information
acquisition investments are (for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j):
(Ri, Rj) =
(
(1, 0), for all 0 < ρ < Ψ,³
Ψ
ρ+Ψ ,
Ψ
ρ+Ψ
´
, otherwise.
(3.8)
3Since the function f(θ) = 1θ+2∆ is strictly convex for all θ > 0, E {f(θ)} > f(E{θ}). And
therefore Ψ > 0.
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4 Mandatory Disclosure Equilibrium
In this section we study the equilibrium in which noncooperative firms are required to
disclose their information (Θi,Θj). Such a disclosure regulation could be implemented
by the threat of severe penalties after withholding of information is discovered. Ob-
serve that the only diﬀerence between the benchmark and this case is that firms do
not coordinate their information acquisition and R&D investment choices.
4.1 Mandatory Disclosure R&D Equilibrium
Equilibrium R&D investments are determined by the trade-oﬀ between marginal rev-
enues and costs of R&D investment. Firm i’s first-order condition of profit maximiza-
tion with respect to investment Di, given Θ and Dj, is as follows:
θE(Θ)Di =W −∆Dj, for i = 1, 2. (4.1)
Both firms’ first-order conditions for profit maximization give the following equilib-
rium investments:
bDi(Θ) = WθE(Θ) +∆ , for i = 1, 2. (4.2)
Again equilibrium investments decrease in the expected costs of R&D. Note that
these equilibrium investments are greater than the joint-profit-maximizing invest-
ments Di(Θ). Competing firms do not internalize the adverse eﬀect that an increase
in their R&D investment has on the chances of their rival to win the race. There-
fore firms overinvest in R&D. This is a standard observation in R&D races where
investments are strategic substitutes. Firm i’s expected equilibrium profits are as
follows:
bπi(Θ) = 1
2
θE(Θ) bDi(Θ)2, for Θ ∈ {θ, θ,∅} (4.3)
4.2 Mandatory Disclosure Information Acquisition
Firm i chooses information acquisition investment Ri such that it maximizes its ex-
pected profit, given the equilibrium information acquisition investment of the rival
firm, bRj, and anticipating equilibrium R&D investments, ( bDi, bDj). Firm i’s expected
revenue of learning cost of investment, Θi = θ, is E {bπi(θ)}. Its expected revenue
of receiving an uninformative signal, Θi = ∅, is RjE {bπi(θ)} + (1 − Rj)bπi(∅). The
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marginal revenue of obtaining an informative signal for firm i is therefore (1−Rj)bΨ,
where:
bΨ ≡ E{bπi(θ)}− bπi(∅) = 1
2
W 2
µ
E
½
θ
(θ +∆)2
¾
− E(θ)
(E(θ) +∆)2
¶
. (4.4)
Note that the firm’s marginal revenue of information acquisition decreases in the
probability with which its rival is informed.4 The higher the likelihood that firm j
is informed, the lower firm i’s incentive to invest in information acquisition itself.
The firms’ second-order conditions for profit maximization are satisfied for all ρ > 0.
Firm i’s equilibrium information acquisition investments are such that marginal cost
of investment equals its marginal revenue:
ρRi = (1−Rj)bΨ, or bRi = bΨ
ρ+ bΨ . (4.5)
When we compare these equilibrium investments with the joint-profit-maximizing in-
formation acquisition investments, we obtain the following. Since each firm’s informa-
tion acquisition investment only contributes to its profit when its rival did not acquire
information, each firm free-rides on the information acquired by its rival. Joint-profit-
maximizing information acquisition investments internalize this externality. This is
stated in the proposition below.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium under mandatory disclosure firms:
(i) overinvest in R&D, i.e. bDi(Θ) > Di(Θ) for all Θ and i = 1, 2;
(ii) remain uninformed with a higher probability than coordinating firms,
i.e. (1− bR1)(1− bR2) > ¡1−R1¢ ¡1−R2¢.
The result of proposition 1 (ii) is the opposite of the result obtained in companion
paper Jansen (2001b). If costs of investment are independently distributed, firms
cannot free-ride on their rival’s information acquisition, and overinvest in information
acquisition.
5 Voluntary Disclosure
In the preceding sections firms were required to disclose their information. This
section studies the equilibria in which firms disclose information voluntarily. Since
4Since the function g(θ) = θ(θ+∆)2 is strictly convex for all θ > 2∆, E{g(θ)} > g(E(θ)), and hencebΨ > 0.
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firms’ costs of investment are perfectly positively correlated the informational eﬀect
is strongest. Therefore the firms’ incentives to conceal good news while disclosing bad
news are strongest in this case. We focus on the implications of this disclosure rule
for R&D investments, and derive conditions under which concealment of good news
and disclosure of bad news is indeed an equilibrium disclosure rule. Subsequently we
determine the equilibrium information acquisition investments given the disclosure of
bad news and concealment of good news.
5.1 Voluntary Disclosure R&D Equilibrium
In this subsection we characterize firms’ R&D investments under partial disclosure.
Both firms conceal good news, δi(θ) = ∅, while they disclose bad news, δi(θ) = θ,
with i = 1, 2. Firms expect information acquisition investments (ri, rj).
We first determine the equilibrium beliefs. Since firms’ costs of R&D investments
are perfectly correlated, there is only incomplete information between firms when
neither firm disclosed any information. Obviously, when one firm disclosed high costs
of investments, both firms expect θ = θ, and invest bD(θ) accordingly. When neither
firm discloses, (δ∗i , δ
∗
j) = (∅,∅), firms are in one of the following two situations. When
firm i receives signal Θi = θ, it knows that its costs of R&D investments are low. A
firm that receives an uninformative signal, Θi = ∅, and faces a rival who does not
disclose information, δ∗i = ∅, knows that nobody received a high-cost signal. Its rival
is either uninformed or conceals a low cost signal. Given this inference and given
expected information acquisition investments, rj, firm i updates its cost expectations
by Bayes’ rule, which gives the following:
Pr[θ = θ|δ∗j = ∅] =
Pr[Θj 6= θ|θ = θ] Pr[θ = θ]
Pr[Θj 6= θ|θ = θ] Pr[θ = θ] + Pr[Θj 6= θ|θ = θ] Pr[θ = θ]
=
p
p+ (1− rj)(1− p)
≡ αj. (5.1)
Therefore the expected cost of R&D is as follows:
Ei(θ|∅,∅) ≡ Ei(θ|Θi = ∅, δ∗j = ∅) = αjθ + (1− αj)θ. (5.2)
Firm i’s belief about firm j’s private signal is as follows:
Pr[Θj = θ|δ∗j = ∅] =
Pr[Θj = θ]
Pr[Θj = θ] + Pr[Θj = ∅]
=
prj
prj + 1− rj
= αjrj. (5.3)
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If no information is disclosed, firms update their beliefs, and maximize expected prof-
its, which results in the following first-order conditions:
θ eDi(θ) = W − ³rj eDj(θ) + (1− rj) eDj(∅)´∆ (5.4)
Ei(θ|∅,∅) eDi(∅) = W − ³αjrj eDj(θ) + (1− αjrj) eDj(∅)´∆, (5.5)
for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. The solution to this system of linear equations, gives us the
four equilibrium R&D investments.
The equilibriumR&D investments of informed firms with low-cost signal, eDi(θ; ri, rj),
have the following property. When your rival invests relatively little in information
acquisition, you assign relatively low probability to facing an informed, aggressive
rival. This gives you a relatively bigger incentive to invest in R&D. The firm that is
expected to have invested more (resp. less) in information acquisition, invests more
(resp. less) in R&D:
eDi(θ; ri, rj) > eDj(θ; rj, ri)⇔ ri > rj, (5.6)
for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
For uninformed firms the reverse holds. When your rival expects that you in-
vested relatively little in information acquisition, this has two eﬀects. On the one
hand your rival expects you to become relatively less pessimistic after receiving no
information. This gives you a strategic advantage compared to your rival, and in-
creases your incentives to invest in R&D. On the other hand your rival expects to
face an uninformed firm relatively more often. This encourages your rival to invest
in R&D. The former cost eﬀect dominates the latter competition eﬀect. Therefore an
uninformed firm that is expected to invest relatively little in information acquisition
invests more aggressively in R&D under partial disclosure:
eDi(∅; ri, rj) > eDj(∅; rj, ri)⇔ ri < rj, (5.7)
for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
With symmetric expected information acquisition investments, i.e. ri = r for
i = 1, 2, the equilibrium R&D investments under partial disclosure are such thateDi(θ; r) ≥ eDi(∅; r). When we compare firm i’s first-order conditions we note the
following. An uninformed firm has higher expected costs, but expects weaker com-
petition. The direct eﬀect of lower costs dominates the indirect competition eﬀect.
Therefore firms with low cost signals invest more than uninformed firms in the sym-
metric R&D equilibrium.
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Observe that for symmetric expected information acquisition investments equi-
librium R&D investments depend in the following way on the expected information
acquisition investments:
∂ eDi(θ; r)
∂r
≤ 0, and ∂
eDi(∅; r)
∂r
≥ 0. (5.8)
Note that we change both ri and rj in equal amounts in the same direction. When
both expected information acquisition investments increase, it becomes more likely
that firms are informed. This implies that concealing firms expect to face stronger
competition in R&D. This discourages R&D investments of firms. Therefore equilib-
rium investments of low-cost firms decrease in the expected information acquisition
investments. An increase in expected information acquisition investments also makes
uninformed firms more optimistic about their own costs of R&D. Since your rival is
less likely to be uninformed, an uninformative message from him makes it more likely
to you that he is actually concealing good news. This positive cost eﬀect dominates
the negative eﬀect of expecting fiercer competition for uninformed firms.
When we compare the symmetric R&D investments under strategic disclosure rule
(δi(θ), δi(θ)) = (∅, θ) with those under mandatory disclosure, we observe the follow-
ing. Given a firm’s individual R&D cost signal, each firm invests more under partial
disclosure than under full disclosure. That is, eDi(θ; r) > bDi(θ) and eDi(∅; r) > bDi(∅),
for i = 1, 2. When firm i knows that it has low R&D costs, it expects weaker com-
petition under partial disclosure than under full disclosure, which encourages higher
investments. Under voluntary disclosure an uninformed firm expects lower R&D costs,
but expects stronger competition. The (direct) cost eﬀect is the dominating eﬀect.
However, this does not mean that the overall overinvestment in R&D is increased.
Because a low-cost firm conceals its costs, there are contingencies, (θ,∅) and (∅, θ),
under which one of the firms remains uninformed under voluntary disclosure. And this
uninformed firm invests less in R&D than its informed counterpart: eDi(∅; r) < bDi(θ).
We summarize our results on equilibrium R&D investments under voluntary dis-
closure in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Given disclosure rule (δi(θ), δi(θ)) = (∅, θ), ri < 1, and i = 1, 2,
i 6= j, the following holds:
(i) For ri < rj: eDi(θ; ri, rj) < eDj(θ; rj, ri) and eDi(∅; ri, rj) > eDj(∅; rj, ri),
(ii) For ri = rj = r and r < 1:
(ii.a) eDi(θ; r) > eDi(∅; r), while ∂ eDi(θ; r)/∂r < 0 and ∂ eDi(∅; r)/∂r > 0,
12
(ii.b) bDi(∅) ≤ eDi(∅; r) < bDi(θ) < eDi(θ; r), and
(ii.c) eDi(∅; 0) = bDi(∅), while eDi(θ; 1) = eDi(∅; 1) = bDi(θ).
Finally we define firm i’s equilibrium R&D profits for symmetric expected infor-
mation acquisition investments as:
eπi(θ; r) = 1
2
θ eDi(θ; r)2, for θ ∈ {θ, θ}, and (5.9)
eπi(∅; r) = 1
2
Ei(θ|∅,∅) eDi(∅; r)2. (5.10)
5.2 Equilibrium Disclosure Strategies
We presumed partial disclosure, (δi(θ), δi(θ)) = (∅, θ), in the previous section. In
this section we find a condition under which partial disclosure is indeed chosen in
equilibrium.
Given expected information acquisition investments (ri, rj), cost signals (Θi,Θj),
and anticipated equilibrium R&D investments ( eDi, eDj), we determine firms’ equilib-
rium disclosure rules. First, we establish the following negative result:
Lemma 1 For ri < 1, with i = 1, 2, the following symmetric combinations of disclo-
sure rules are not chosen in equilibrium:
(i) Full disclosure of information, (δi(θ), δi(θ)) = (θ, θ),
(ii) Disclosure of low cost only, (δi(θ), δi(θ)) = (θ,∅),
(iii) No disclosure of any information, (δi(θ), δi(θ)) = (∅,∅).
Full disclosure cannot be an equilibrium, since firms prefer to deviate by concealing
good news. Nor can full concealment be an equilibrium disclosure rule, because a
high-cost firm prefers to unilaterally disclose its information.
In general firms have an incentive to manipulate the disclosed information such
that it makes their rival most pessimistic about his cost of R&D investment. This is
a consequence of the dominating informational eﬀect. The indirect, strategic eﬀect of
such a disclosure rule is that it makes the rival more optimistic about the concealing
firm’s R&D investments. The strategic eﬀect is however outweighed by the informa-
tional eﬀect in this setting. This suggests that disclosing only high costs of investment
could be an equilibrium disclosure rule. In the next proposition we find a condition
under which this is indeed the case.
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Proposition 3 If
p ≥ (θ −∆)∆
(θ −∆)∆+ (θ −∆)θ
, (C.1)
then partial disclosure (eδi(θ),eδi(θ)) = (∅, θ) is an equilibrium disclosure rule for any
expected information acquisition investments (ri, rj).
From this proposition we can conclude that under suﬃcient condition (C.1) the
informational eﬀect dominates the strategic eﬀect of information disclosure. By dis-
closing bad news, and concealing good news, firms make their rival pessimistic about
the actual costs of R&D investment. If the condition is not met, only asymmetric
and possibly mixed-strategy disclosure equilibria exist. Section 7 discusses condition
(C.1) in greater detail, and gives illustrating examples of cases in which the strategic
eﬀect dominates the informational eﬀect.
This rule is the opposite of the equilibrium disclosure rule in companion paper
Jansen (2001b), where costs are independently distributed. Since there is no infor-
mational eﬀect of information disclosure in that paper, the strategic eﬀect dominates,
and firms only disclose good news, as in lemma 1 (ii). Cost correlation therefore has
a dramatic eﬀect on the equilibrium disclosure rules.
5.3 Voluntary Disclosure Information Acquisition
In this subsection we assume that condition (C.1) is met. We can therefore focus atten-
tion on equilibrium candidates in which firms anticipate disclosure rule (eδi(θ),eδi(θ))
and R&D investments eDi for i = 1, 2.
Firm i’s expected profits, given information acquisition investments, (Ri, Rj), equi-
librium disclosure rules, R&D investments and beliefs, are as follows:
Eθ
n
πi(eD; θ)¯¯¯Ro = pRiπi ³ eDi(θ; r), eDj; θ´+ p(1−Ri)πi ³ eDi(∅; r), eDj; θ´+
+(1− p) (Ri + (1−Ri)Rj)πi
³ eDi(θ), eDj; θ´+
+(1− p)(1−Ri)(1−Rj)πi
³ eDi(∅; r), eDj; θ´− 1
2
ρR2i .(5.11)
When we take the first-order condition with respect to Ri, and let firms’ expectations
be realized and symmetric, ri = Ri = R, we get equilibrium condition ρ eR = eΨ( eR),
with:
eΨ(R) = p [eπi(θ;R)− eπi(∅;R)] + (1− p)(1−R) £eπi(θ;R)− eπi(∅;R)¤ . (5.12)
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Clearly the firms’ second-order conditions for profit maximization are satisfied for all
ρ > 0. With probability p firms have low costs of R&D. In that case a firm’s rival
never discloses information. Therefore a marginal increase in information acquisition
investment could change a firm’s revenue from that of an uninformed to that of a
low-cost firm’s revenue. When firms have high costs of investment, a firm’s infor-
mation acquisition investments only makes a diﬀerence if its rival did not obtain an
informative signal on the costs. Because if the rival would get a high-cost signal, he
would disclose it in equilibrium.
The comparison of the information acquisition investments under mandatory and
voluntary disclosure, result in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that firms anticipate equilibrium disclosure rules (eδi,eδj) and
R&D investments ( eDi, eDj). Then firms invest more in information acquisition under
voluntary information disclosure than under mandatory information disclosure: eRi ≥bRi for i = 1, 2. Strict inequality holds for interior equilibrium information acquisition
investments.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Since high R&D costs are always dis-
closed in equilibrium, the incentives to acquire information on high costs are the same
under mandated and voluntary disclosure. We can therefore ignore high cost signals in
comparing information acquisition incentives under voluntary and mandatory disclo-
sure. The incentives to learn low R&D costs diﬀer between mandatory and voluntary
disclosure. When firm i’s information acquisition investment results in a low cost
signal, Θi = θ, this generates greater expected profit for a concealing firm than for a
firm that is required to disclose this signal (see proposition 2, iib). This clearly in-
creases firms’ incentives to acquire information under voluntary disclosure. However,
an uninformative signal gives rise to the following trade-oﬀ. When firm i’s information
acquisition investment did not result in a low cost signal, then either firm j received
good news, Θj = θ, or no firm received any information. If firm j received good news,
firm i cannot take a free-ride on this acquired information under voluntary disclo-
sure. This gives firms under voluntary disclosure an incentive to invest in information
acquisition. On the other hand, if both firms remain uninformed, firms become less
pessimistic about their R&D costs, and generate a bigger expected R&D profit under
voluntary disclosure than under mandatory disclosure. This gives firms a disincentive
to invest in information acquisition under voluntary disclosure. The information ac-
quisition incentive of foregoing information free-riding outweighs the disincentive from
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lower pessimism of uninformed firms under voluntary disclosure. Therefore the over-
all information acquisition incentive is bigger under voluntary disclosure than under
mandatory disclosure.
While companion paper Jansen (2001b) obtained a similar result for certain pa-
rameter values, proposition 4 holds for all parameter values.
6 Overall Profit Comparison
So far we compared equilibrium investments under mandatory disclosure with those
under voluntary disclosure. A remaining question is how expected profits compare
between the regimes.
First we compare expected equilibrium profits for a given information acquisition
level. When the firms have symmetric and exogenous information acquisition invest-
ment levels, (R,R), firm i’s expected equilibrium profit under mandatory disclosure
is:
bΠi(R; ρ) = (1− (1−R)2)Eθ {bπi(θ)}+ (1−R)2bπi(∅)− 1
2
ρR2. (6.1)
Under voluntary disclosure firm i’s expected equilibrium profit is:
eΠi(R; ρ) = Rpeπi(θ;R) + (1− (1−R)2)(1− p)eπi(θ) +
+(1−R)[p+ (1− p)(1−R)]eπi(∅;R)− 1
2
ρR2. (6.2)
The diﬀerence between these expected profit levels simplifies to:
bΠi(R; ρ)− eΠi(R; ρ) = (1−R)1
2
¡
pθ + (1− p)(1−R)θ
¢ h bDi(∅)2 − eDi(∅;R)2i+
+pR
1
2
θ
h bDi(θ)2 − eDi(θ;R)2i+ p(1−R)R1
2
θ
h bDi(θ)2 − bDi(∅)2i . (6.3)
This expression contains the following three terms. First, given that firms do not
discover R&D costs, firm i’s R&D investments under voluntary disclosure exceed those
under mandated disclosure. Therefore the first term is negative. The second term is
also negative, and reflects the informational eﬀect for an informed firm. Third, there is
an expected profit gain of mandatory disclosure when R&D costs are low and firm i’s
rival is the only firm who is informed. The gain is the diﬀerence between the expected
profits of becoming informed, which happens under mandatory disclosure, and the
expected profits of remaining uninformed, as happens under voluntary disclosure.
The third term is therefore positive.
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For R = 0 and R = 1 the profit losses from the informational eﬀect exactly
equal the profit gain from being more informed, i.e. both bΠi(0; ρ) = eΠi(0; ρ) andbΠi(1; ρ) = eΠi(1; ρ). For intermediate information acquisition investments, the trade-
oﬀ between profit gain and losses is more subtle. Proposition 5 summarizes the trade-
oﬀ. First we introduce the following condition:
(E(θ)−∆)(θ2 − 2θ∆−∆2) ≥ 4θ∆2 (C.2)
Proposition 5 Under condition (C.2), bΠi(R; ρ) > eΠi(R; ρ) for all R ∈ (0, 1). Oth-
erwise, there is an R0 ∈ (0, 1) such that bΠi(R; ρ) < eΠi(R; ρ) for all R ∈ (0, R0), whilebΠi(R; ρ) > eΠi(R; ρ) for all R ∈ (R0, 1).
In our model information acquisition investments are endogenous. An overall profit
comparison should therefore compare expected profit level bΠi( bR; ρ) with eΠi( eR; ρ).
This profit comparison is not obvious for all parameter values. On the one hand, it
follows from proposition 5 that in many cases firms expect higher profits under manda-
tory disclosure than under voluntary disclosure for a given R. In particular, for R = eR
we obtain bΠi( eR; ρ) > eΠi( eR; ρ) in many cases. On the other hand, proposition 4 es-
tablished that firms invest less in information acquisition under mandatory disclosure
than under voluntary disclosure, i.e. bRi < eRi. Moreover, under mandatory disclosure
the firms’ expected equilibrium revenues increase in R, i.e. bΠ0i(R; 0) = 2(1−R)bΨ > 0.
Therefore bΠi( bR; ρ) < bΠi( eR; ρ) for suﬃciently low ρ. These two observations make the
comparison between bΠi( bR; ρ) and eΠi( eR; ρ) not obvious in many cases.
A similar trade-oﬀ emerges for independently distributed costs of investment, as
companion paper Jansen (2001b) illustrates. With independent R&D costs firms
expect higher profits under mandatory disclosure for given information acquisition
investments. But firms acquire less information in some cases.
For extreme costs of information acquisition, the following observations are imme-
diate. When information acquisition is costless, i.e. ρ = 0, firms invest the maximum
amount in information acquisition under both mandatory and voluntary disclosure:bR = eR = 1. In that case expected profits are equal, i.e. bΠi(1; 0) = eΠi(1; 0) =
Eθ{bπi(θ)}. For positive but small cost parameter ρ we observe the following. Propo-
sition 5 shows that if exogenous information acquisition investments are close to one,
firms always expect higher profits under mandated disclosure, i.e. bΠi( eR; ρ) > eΠi( eR; ρ)
for eR close to 1. It is easy to verify that the marginal revenues of information acqui-
sition converge to zero if the information acquisition investments approach one, i.e.
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dbΠi(1; 0)/dR = deΠi(1; 0)/dR = 0. Consequently a reduction of information acquisi-
tion investment from eR to bR does not drastically reduce the expected profit under
mandatory disclosure. We do therefore conjure that firms’ overall equilibrium prof-
its are higher under mandatory disclosure for suﬃciently small costs of information
acquisition. We proof this conjecture in proposition 6 (i).
At the other extreme, when information acquisition is infinitely expensive (ρ →
∞), firms acquire no information in equilibrium, i.e. bR = eR = 0. For zero equilibrium
information acquisition investments firms receive identical expected profits under vol-
untary disclosure and under mandatory disclosure, since bΠi(0; ρ) = eΠi(0; ρ) = bπi(∅).
For intermediate costs of investment, we introduce the following constant:
C0 ≡ 3bΨ2 + 2eΨ(0)"deΨ(0)
dR
− pθ eD(θ; 0)∂ eDi(θ; 0)
∂r
#
− eΨ(0)2, (6.4)
and obtain the following result.
Proposition 6 (i) There is a bρ > 0 such that for all 0 < ρ < bρ expected profit under
mandated disclosure exceeds expected profit under voluntary disclosure: bΠi( bR(ρ); ρ) >eΠi( eR(ρ); ρ). (ii) If C0 < 0 (resp. C0 > 0), there is a eρ < ∞ such that for all
ρ > eρ expected profit under voluntary disclosure is bigger (resp. smaller) than under
mandated disclosure: eΠi( eR(ρ); ρ) > bΠi( bR(ρ); ρ) (resp. eΠi( eR(ρ); ρ) < bΠi( bR(ρ); ρ)).
We can conclude from proposition 6 (i) that firms expect to be best oﬀ under
mandatory disclosure, if information acquisition is not costly. If, on the other hand,
information acquisition is extremely costly, as in proposition 6 (ii), then the overall
eﬀect of disclosure regulation on expected profits depends on parameter values.
7 Discussion
After the characterization of equilibrium investments in the regular case of disclosure
rule (eδi(θ),eδi(θ)), we discuss in more detail the conditions under which this disclosure
rule is indeed chosen in equilibrium. Condition (C.1) is a suﬃcient condition for
obtaining the disclosure rule given any feasible combination of expected information
acquisition investments. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions under which firms only
disclose high costs in equilibrium are stated in the following proposition.
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Proposition 7 Firms disclose only high cost information, (eδi(θ),eδi(θ)) = (∅, θ) for
i = 1, 2, in equilibrium iﬀ:
rj ≤ min
(
1,
θ
¡
pθ + (1− p)θ −∆
¢
(1− p)(θ −∆) (θ + (1− ri)∆)
)
(C.3)
and
rj ≥ max
(
0,
(θ −∆) (pθ − (1− p)∆) + (1− p)(1− ri)
¡
θθ −∆2
¢
(1− p)
¡
(1− ri)(θ − θ)− ri(θ −∆)
¢
∆
)
(C.4)
for i, j = 1, 2 (i 6= j).
Observe the tight link between expected information acquisition investments and
equilibrium disclosure rules. Not only do the information acquisition investments
depend on the anticipated equilibrium disclosure rules, but also the equilibrium dis-
closure rules depend in a nontrivial way on the expected information acquisition in-
vestments.
In figure 2 we illustrate the conditions of the proposition for parameter values
p = 1
50
, ∆ = 1
2
, W = 1, θ = 2, θ = 3. Along the horizontal axis we put firm i’s
expected information acquisition investment, ri, while along the vertical axis we put
rj. When one of the conditions is violated, the strategic eﬀect is the dominating
eﬀect for one of the firms. The solid boundaries represent the boundaries of condition
(C.3). When condition (C.3) is not met, unilateral disclosure of good news becomes
profitable given beliefs that are consistent with partial disclosure. Parameter values
for which this occurs are north-west and south-east of the solid lines in figure 2. The
dashed boundaries represent boundaries of condition (C.4). Unilateral concealment of
bad news becomes profitable when condition (C.4) is not met, given beliefs consistent
with partial disclosure. The set of parameter values for which this is profitable are
north-west and south-east of the dashed lines in figure 2. In the remaining area
the informational eﬀect dominates the strategic eﬀect of information disclosure. For
this numerical example condition (C.3) is stronger than condition (C.4). For other
parameter values the reverse can hold.
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Figure 2: Partial disclosure region
A firm has an incentive to unilaterally disclose (resp. conceal) to make its rival
realize (resp. believe) that he is facing a “strong” competitor in the R&D stage of
the race. In these situations firms’ expected information acquisition investments and
beliefs are such that the informational eﬀect plays a minor role, and the strategic
eﬀect dominates. In the remainder of this subsection we discuss the intuition behind
firms’ incentives to deviate from partial disclosure in more detail. We discuss two
cases. In the first case there is a firm that has an incentive to disclose good news.
And in the second case there is a firm that has an incentive to conceal bad news.
¥ First we consider the case in which firm i prefers to deviate from disclosure rule eδi
by disclosing a low cost signal. Take θ = θ, and ri = ε, rj = 1−ε, with ε, p > 0 small.
Suppose that firm j has equilibrium beliefs and investments, and firm i received an
informative signal, Θi = θ. When p is close to zero, an uninformed firm expects to
have approximately high R&D costs θ, and does not expect to compete against a
low-cost rival. An uninformed firm will therefore approximately invest bDi(θ), and be
a weak competitor in the R&D stage.
If firm j receives a low-cost signal, it assigns probability ε to facing a low-cost
rival, and probability 1− ε to facing a weak, uninformed firm. Since firm j puts high
probability (1− ε) on facing an uninformed rival, it becomes an aggressive investor in
the R&D stage. Informed firm i, however, assigns high probability (1 − ε) to facing
such a low-cost, aggressive rival, and probability ε to facing a weak, uninformed
rival. This gives firm i a disincentive to invest in R&D. For low enough ε firm i’s
incentives to invest in R&D under information concealment are lower than those
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under information disclosure. Therefore firm i’s expected profits under concealment
are lower than his profit under disclosure. Firm i surprises its rival with the news that
it will be an aggressive investor in the R&D stage by disclosing its low-cost signal.
That is, informed firm j revises its beliefs about firm i’s R&D investments drastically,
which lowers its incentives to invest substantially. For small enough p and ε this
strategic eﬀect outweighs the informational eﬀect of disclosure. This gives firm i an
incentive to unilaterally disclose low costs, given the proposed equilibrium beliefs and
expected information acquisition investments.
¥ In the second case there is a firm that has an incentive to conceal bad news. Take
θ = θ, and ri = ε, rj = 1− ε, with ε, p > 0 small. Suppose that firm j is uninformed
and has equilibrium beliefs and investments, and firm i received a bad signal, Θi = θ,
and conceals. When ε is close to zero and no information is disclosed, firm j thinks
that firm i is almost surely uninformed. If firm i would be uninformed, it would
infer R&D costs θ from firm j’s uninformative message. Therefore firm j anticipates
approximately equilibrium investment bDi(θ) from firm i. That is, firm j expects an
aggressive rival after receiving an uninformative message, δ∗i = ∅. Furthermore, for ε
close to zero firm j expects that firm i is uninformed, which gives firm j an expected
R&D cost of pθ+(1− p)θ. For low enough prior probability p firm j’s expected R&D
cost is approximately θ. That is, for suﬃciently low p and ε firm j expects high R&D
costs and an aggressive rival, which depresses its investments. These investments
become in fact lower than bDj(θ). Therefore, firm i has an incentive to unilaterally
conceal a high-cost signal. Concealment makes uninformed firm j expect aggressive
R&D competition, which lowers its investments. This strategic eﬀect of concealment
dominates its informational eﬀect. Therefore firm i has an incentive to unilaterally
conceal its high costs in these cases.
The preceding examples of profitable unilateral deviations rely heavily on asym-
metry between firms’ expected information acquisition investments. It is immediate
that conditions (C.3) and (C.4) are always met for symmetric expected information
acquisition investments: ri = rj.5 We also saw that the examples worked in particular
for small prior probability p. For big enough prior probability p, i.e. p as in condition
(C.1), we always get partial disclosure in equilibrium. When expected information
acquisition investments are asymmetric and the prior probability is suﬃciently small,
5This follows directly from studying the conditions (see, e.g. figure 2), and from the characteriza-
tion of symmetric equilibrium R&D investments under partial disclosure in the previous subsection.
In particular, recall that for ri = rj , eDi(θ) ≥ bDi(θ) and eDi(∅) ≥ bDi(θ), for i = 1, 2.
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we would expect asymmetric, and possibly mixed equilibrium disclosure rules. The
characterization of the equilibrium disclosure rules for these asymmetric cases awaits
future research.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the interaction between information acquisition, strategic
disclosure and R&D in a competitive setting. We have seen that disclosure regulation
substantially aﬀects firms’ investments, both in information acquisition as well as in
R&D.
We have explained the increased competition after IBM’s breakthrough in the
research of superconductivity. Not only did we replicate Choi’s (1991) results, but we
could also indicate in what direction equilibrium investments and profits change when
disclosure is no longer required. Furthermore we have been able to explain how firm’s
investments and profits are aﬀected by disclosure regulation. In particular, firms
typically expect higher profits for given information acquisition investments under
mandatory disclosure, but they acquire less information.
In companion paper Jansen (2001b) we show how disclosure regulation aﬀects
investments, disclosure, and profits in a model with independently distributed costs
of investments. In that model firms preannounce good news in equilibrium, which
would be consistent with Microsoft’s strategic preannouncements. Cost correlation
does not only aﬀect equilibrium disclosure rules, but also has dramatically eﬀects on
information acquisition investments.
We studied the eﬀects of disclosure regulation in a “winner-take-all” race. In
practice part of the winner’s prize spills over to the loser of the race. It would be
interesting to study the eﬀects of limited appropriability in this model. Such a problem
is studied, with diﬀerent informational assumptions, in Jansen (2001a). Revenue
sharing between a winner and loser of the race creates free-rider incentives between
the competing firm. Initially the free-rider incentives correct some of the distorting
externalities among competing firms. Subsequently the free-rider eﬀect of revenue
sharing erodes the firms’ incentives to invest in R&D and information acquisition.
A natural next step would be to study how results change for intermediate degrees
of correlations. For intermediate degrees of correlation we would expect a more subtle
trade-oﬀ between the informational and strategic eﬀect of information disclosure. This
extension of the basic analysis awaits future research.
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A Appendix
This Appendix contains proofs to the main propositions of this paper.
A.1 Mandatory Disclosure, Proposition 1
Part (i) of the proposition is obvious. For part (ii) we first show that bΨ < Ψ. Decom-
pose bΨ as follows:
2bΨ
W 2
=
µ
E
½
1
θ +∆
¾
− 1
E(θ) +∆
¶
−∆
µ
E
½
1
(θ +∆)2
¾
− 1
(E(θ) +∆)2
¶
, (A.1)
and note that
Ψ− 2bΨ
W 2
= ∆
µ
E
½
1
(θ +∆)2
¾
− 1
(E(θ) +∆)2
¶
−∆
µ
E
½
1
(θ +∆)(θ + 2∆)
¾
− 1
(E(θ) +∆)(E(θ) + 2∆)
¶
= ∆2
µ
E
½
1
(θ +∆)2(θ + 2∆)
¾
− 1
(E(θ) +∆)2(E(θ) + 2∆)
¶
, (A.2)
which is positive, since g(θ) ≡ 1
(θ+∆)2(θ+2∆) is convex in θ, and therefore E (g(θ)) >
g (E(θ)). The equilibrium and total-profit-maximizing probabilities of remaining un-
informed equal, respectively:
(1− bR1)(1− bR2) = ρ2³
ρ+ bΨ´2 and (1−R1)(1−R2) =
(
0, for all ρ < Ψ,
ρ2
(ρ+Ψ)
2 , otherwise.
(A.3)
Since bΨ < Ψ, (1− bR1)(1 − bR2) > (1 − R1)(1 − R2) clearly holds for all ρ > 0. This
proves the proposition.¤
A.2 Voluntary Disclosure
We prove proposition 2, lemma 1, and propositions 3 and 4, respectively.
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 2 (R&D)
First we calculate equilibrium R&D investments under partial disclosure. We substi-
tute equation (5.4) in equation (5.5). Since p(1− rj)αj = (1− rj)αj, this transforms
the uninformed firm’s reaction function into:
pEi(θ|∅,∅) eDi(∅) = pW − αj ³W − θ eDi(θ)´+ (1− p)rjαj eDj(θ)∆. (A.4)
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Substituting this expression in low-signal firm i’s reaction function, equation (5.4),
results in the following expression:
eDi(θ) = ¡θ∗j + (1− p)ri(1− rj)∆¢W − ¡rjθ∗j + (1− rj)θ¢ eDj(θ)∆¡θθ∗j + (1− p)ri(1− rj)∆2¢ (A.5)
with θ∗j = pθ + (1− p)(1− ri)θ, for i, j = 1, 2 (i 6= j). Following a similar procedure
for the uninformed firms, we obtain:
αjθ eDi(θ) = αjW − ³W −Ei(θ|∅,∅) eDi(∅)´+ (1− p)(1− rj)
prj + 1− rj
eDj(∅)∆. (A.6)
Substitution of this expression in uninformed firm i’s reaction function, equation (5.5),
gives the following expression:
eDi(∅) = (θ(1− rj + prj) + (1− p)(1− ri)rj∆)W − ¡rjθ∗j + (1− rj)θ¢ eDj(∅)∆
(θθ∗i + (1− p)(1− ri)rj∆2)
,
(A.7)
for i, j = 1, 2 (i 6= j). From expressions (A.5) and (A.7) we can derive the equilibrium
R&D investments.
(i) After calculating the equilibrium R&D investments, we note that eDi(θ) − eDj(θ)
is proportional to (1 − p)2∆W (1 − ri)(1 − rj)(θ − ∆)(θ − θ)(ri − rj), which gives
the observation directly. We also note that eDi(∅) − eDj(∅) is proportional to p(1 −
p)θW (θ −∆)(θ − θ)(rj − ri), which provides the characterization directly.
(ii) For ri = r equilibrium R&D investments follow directly from expressions (A.5)
and (A.7). In particular these investments are as follows:
eDi(θ; r) = [pθ + (1− p)(1− r)(θ + r∆)]W
pθ(θ +∆) + (1− p)(1− r)(θ +∆)(θ + r∆)
, and (A.8)
eDi(∅; r) = [pθ + (1− p)(1− r)(θ + r∆)]W
pθ(θ +∆) + (1− p)(1− r)(θ +∆)(θ + r∆)
, (A.9)
for i = 1, 2. Taking first derivatives gives:
∂ eDi(θ; r)
∂r
=
−(1− p)(1− r)∆(θ − θ)
¡
(1− p)(1− r)(θ +∆) + 2pθ
¢
W£
pθ(θ +∆) + (1− p)(1− r)(θ +∆)(θ + r∆)
¤2 ≤ 0,(A.10)
∂ eDi(∅; r)
∂r
=
(1− p)pθ(θ − θ) (θ − (1− 2r)∆)W£
pθ(θ +∆) + (1− p)(1− r)(θ +∆)(θ + r∆)
¤2 ≥ 0. (A.11)
Comparisons between investment levels are straightforward. This completes the proof.¤
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A.2.2 Proof of Lemma 1 (Disclosure Disequilibria)
(i) Suppose full disclosure, i.e. rule (δi(θ), δi(θ)) = (θ, θ), is chosen in equilibrium.
Consequently, firms j’s R&D investments are bDj(θ), bDj(∅) and bDj(θ), with j = 1, 2.
But when low-cost firm i anticipates these investments, it has an incentive to conceal
its information. Given equilibrium beliefs, disclosure choice δi(θ) = ∅ only aﬀects
investments when firm j is uninformed, which happens with probability 1 − rj > 0.
An uninformed firm j that receives message δ∗i = ∅ from its rival invests bDj(∅),
which is less than the investment bDj(θ) after disclosure of Θi = θ. Firm j’s expected
R&D investments under concealment are therefore greater than its investment under
disclosure. Therefore firm i’s optimal deviation investment, and consequently its
expected deviation profit, is greater than in the proposed equilibrium. Consequently
full disclosure is not part of an equilibrium strategy.
(ii) Intuitive given (i) and (iii).
(iii) Disclosure rule (δi(θ), δi(θ)) = (∅,∅) discloses no information about cost signals.
In this case firms can only condition their R&D investments on their own observed
cost signal. Firm i invests Doi (θ), Doi (∅) and Doi (θ) in R&D after receiving Θi = θ,
∅ and θ, respectively. These investments are determined by the following first-order
conditions:
θDoi (θ) = W −
¡
rjD
o
j (θ) + (1− rj)Doj (∅)
¢
∆ (A.12)
θDoi (θ) = W −
¡
rjD
o
j (θ) + (1− rj)Doj (∅)
¢
∆ (A.13)
E(θ)Doi (∅) = W −
¡
rjpD
o
j (θ) + rj(1− p)Doj (θ) + (1− rj)Doj (∅)
¢
∆ (A.14)
Note that
E(θ)Doi (∅) = pθDoi (θ) + (1− p)θDoi (θ). (A.15)
Given these investments and beliefs we can show that a firm with signal Θi = θ
has an incentive to disclose its information. If the high-signal firm i would choose
investments Doi (θ) it would receive an expected profit of 12θD
o
i (θ)2. When this firm
discloses its information it gets 1
2
θ bDi(θ)2. Deviating from concealment is therefore
profitable whenever Doi (θ) < bDi(θ). We use expression (A.15) to reduce the R&D
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equilibrium conditions under no-disclosure to the following system of equations
θDoi (θ) = W −
µ
rj + (1− rj)
pθ
E(θ)
¶
Doj (θ)∆− (1− rj)
(1− p)θ
E(θ)
Doj (θ)∆, (A.16)
= W −
µ
rj
pθ
+
1− rj
E(θ)
¶¡
pθDoj (θ) + (1− p)θDoj (θ)
¢
∆+
rj(1− p)θ
pθ
Doj (θ)∆,
θDoi (θ) = W − rjDoj (θ)∆−
1− rj
E(θ)
¡
pθDoj (θ) + (1− p)θDoj (θ)
¢
∆. (A.17)
By substituting equation (A.17) into equation (A.16), we can write the low-signal firm
i’s optimal R&D investments as a function of firms’ high-signal investments only:
(1− rj)pθ2Doi (θ) = −rjE(θ)W + rjE(θ)Doj (θ)∆+ (rjE(θ) + (1− rj)pθ) θDoi (θ).
(A.18)
When we substitute this expression back in equation (A.17), we obtain expression:
Doi (θ) =
E(θ) [(1− ri)θ + ri(1− rj)∆]W −AoDoj (θ)∆
E(θ)
£
(1− ri)θθ + ri(1− rj)∆2
¤ , with (A.19)
Ao ≡ (1− ri)θ
¡
rjE(θ) + (1− rj)(1− p)θ
¢
+ (1− rj)θ (riE(θ) + (1− ri)pθ) ≥ 0.
When this function does not intersect with the set
n
D ∈ [0, 1]2
¯¯¯
Di ≥ bDi(θ), i = 1, 2o,
any equilibrium investment Doi (θ) is smaller than bDi(θ). Since the function is non-
increasing in Doj (θ), it suﬃces to show that a firm’s optimal reaction to rival’s invest-
ment bDj(θ) under concealment is smaller than bDi(θ). After we evaluate expression
(A.19) in Doj (θ) = bDj(θ) and subtract bDi(θ), we obtain:
−p∆θ(1− ri)(1− rj)(θ − θ)W
(θ +∆)E(θ)
£
(1− ri)θθ + ri(1− rj)∆2
¤ ≤ 0. (A.20)
Since this expression is negative for (ri, rj) < (1, 1), unilateral disclosure of θ is prof-
itable for firm i. This completes the proof.¤
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3 (Disclosure Equilibrium)
The proof to this proposition directly follows from necessary and suﬃcient conditions
(C.3) and (C.4) of proposition 7. Observe that the critical values for rj of these
conditions are increasing in ri. It therefore suﬃces to evaluate the critical value of
condition (C.3) at ri = 0, and find the prior probabilities p for which the critical
value exceeds 1. This results in condition (C.1). For critical value (C.4) it suﬃces to
evaluate it at ri = 1, and find the p for which it does not exceed zero. This happens
for p ≥ ∆θ+∆ , which is satisfied under (C.1). This completes the proof.¤
26
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 4 (Information Acquisition)
Equilibrium information acquisition investments under voluntary disclosure are bigger
than under mandatory disclosure whenever marginal revenues of information acquisi-
tion under voluntary disclosure exceed marginal revenues under mandatory disclosure.
Since high-cost firms earn identical R&D profits under mandatory and voluntary dis-
closure, we can ignore these profit levels in the comparison of marginal revenues. Since
we focus on symmetric information acquisition equilibria, we take Ri = ri = R for
i = 1, 2. We can rewrite the equilibrium marginal revenues of information acquisition
under required disclosure, net of high-cost firms’ revenues, to:
(1−R)bΨ ≡ p1
2
θ bDi(θ)2 − 1
2
¡
pθ + (1− p)(1−Rj)θ
¢ bDi(∅)2 − pRj 1
2
θ
³ bDi(θ)2 − bDi(∅)2´ .
(A.21)
Equilibrium marginal revenues of information acquisition under voluntary disclosure,
net of high-cost firms’ revenues, are:
eΨ(R) ≡ p1
2
θ eDi(θ;R)2 − 1
2
¡
pθ + (1− p)(1−R)θ
¢ eDi(∅;R)2. (A.22)
We must therefore check that for all R:eΨ(R)− (1−R)bΨ = p1
2
θ
³ eDi(θ;R)2 − bDi(θ)2´+ pR1
2
θ
³ bDi(θ)2 − bDi(∅)2´
−1
2
¡
pθ + (1− p)(1−R)θ
¢ ³ eDi(∅;R)2 − bDi(∅)2´ > 0.(A.23)
The first term of (A.23) is positive, since eDi(θ;R) > bDi(θ). Define the following
function:
G(R) ≡ 1
2
¡
pθ + (1− p)(1−R)θ
¢ ³ eDi(∅;R)2 − bDi(∅)2´− pR1
2
θ
³ bDi(θ)2 − bDi(∅)2´ .
(A.24)
Now we need to show that G(R) ≤ 0 for all R to complete the proof. Observe that
for R = 0, eDi(∅; 0) = bDi(∅), which makes G(0) = 0. For R = 1, eDi(∅; 1) = bDi(θ),
which implies that G(1) = 0. Therefore, for G(R) ≤ 0 for all R ∈ (0, 1), it suﬃces to
show that G is convex in R. Note that
G00(R) =
1
2
· d
2
dR2
n¡
pθ + (1− p)(1−R)θ
¢ eDi(∅;R)2o
= eDi(∅;R)(¡pθ + (1− p)(1−R)θ¢ d2 eDi(∅;R)
dR2
− 2(1− p)θd
eDi(∅;R)
dR
)
+
+
¡
pθ + (1− p)(1−R)θ
¢Ãd eDi(∅;R)
dR
!2
. (A.25)
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It is straightforward to verify that:
¡
pθ + (1− p)(1−R)θ
¢ d2 eDi(∅;R)
dR2
− 2(1− p)θd
eDi(∅;R)
dR
=
2W (1− p)pθ(θ − θ)∆g(R; θ)¡
pθ(θ +∆) + (1− p)(1−R)(θ +∆)(θ +R∆)
¢3 , (A.26)
with
g(R; θ) ≡ (1− p)2(1−R)3∆θ2 + (1− p)(1−R)2 (3pθ + (1− p)(1−R)∆)∆θ +
+pθ
¡
θ2 − (1− 3R+ p(3R− 2))∆θ + (1− p)(1− 3R+ 3R2)∆2
¢
.(A.27)
Since
∂g(R; θ)
∂θ
= (1− p)(1−R)2∆
¡
(1− p)(1−R)(2θ +∆) + 3pθ
¢
≥ 0, (A.28)
and θ > θ, we obtain
g(R; θ) ≥ g(R; θ) = θ(θ +∆)
¡
pθ + (1− p)∆(pR3 + (1−R)3)
¢
> 0. (A.29)
Therefore G00(R) > 0, which completes the proof.¤
A.3 Overall Profit Comparison
We prove propositions 5 and 6.
A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 5 (Exogenous Information Acquisition)
It is straightforward to rewrite expected profit diﬀerence (6.3) to the following:
bΠi(R)− eΠi(R) = p(1− p)2R(1−R)2(θ − θ)2H(R)
(θ +∆)2(E(θ) +∆)2[pθ(θ +∆) + (1− p)(1−R)(θ +∆)(θ +R∆)]2
,
(A.30)
where H(R) ≡ αRR2 + βR+ γ, with:
αR ≡ − [2(θ −∆) +R∆] (1− p)∆
£
θE(θ)θ − (θ +E(θ) + θ)∆2 − 2∆3
¤
(A.31)
β ≡ (2θ −∆)(1− p)∆
£
θE(θ)θ − (θ +E(θ) + θ)∆2 − 2∆3
¤
+
+pθ(θ +∆)2[E(θ)(θ −∆)− 2∆3] +
−θ(E(θ) +∆)
£
(E(θ)−∆)(θ2 − 2θ∆−∆2)− 4θ∆2
¤
, and (A.32)
γ ≡ θ(E(θ) +∆)
£
(E(θ)−∆)(θ2 − 2θ∆−∆2)− 4θ∆2
¤
. (A.33)
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It is immediate that bΠi(0) = eΠi(0) and bΠi(1) = eΠi(1). Moreover, for R ∈ (0, 1),bΠi(R)− eΠi(R) can only change sign if H(R) changes sign. Note that H(1) > 0, since
α1 + β + γ = pθ(θ +∆)2[E(θ)(θ −∆)− 2∆3] ≥ pθ(θ +∆)3(θ − 2∆) > 0. (A.34)
Furthermore, H(R) is concave in R, since:
H 00(R) ≡ −2 [2(θ −∆) + 3∆R] (1− p)∆
£
θE(θ)θ − (θ +E(θ) + θ)∆2 − 2∆3
¤
≤ −2 [2(θ −∆) + 3∆R] (1− p)∆(θ +∆)[θ(θ −∆)− 2∆2]
≤ −2 [2(θ −∆) + 3∆R] (1− p)∆(θ +∆)2(θ − 2∆) < 0 for all R. (A.35)
ThereforeH(R) changes sign at most once on domain [0, 1]. In particular, ifH(0) ≥ 0,
then H(R) > 0 for all R > 0. While, if H(0) < 0, then there is a critical value R0
such that H(R) < 0 for all R < R0, H(R0) = 0, and H(R) > 0 for all R > R0. Finally
it suﬃces to observe that H(0) = γ ≥ 0 iﬀ condition (C.2) is satisfied, to complete
the proof of the proposition.¤
A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 6 (Endogenous Information Acquisition)
For eachR ∈ [0, 1] there is a cost of information acquisition, eρ(R), such that eR(eρ(R)) =
R. In particular, eρ(R) = eΨ(R)/R. Since eρ(.) is monotonic in R, a marginal increase
in R corresponds one-to-one to a marginal decrease in the cost of information acqui-
sition ρ. At cost of investment eρ(R) voluntary disclosing firms invest R and receive
expected equilibrium profit eΠi(R), where:
eΠi(R) = eΠiÃR; eΨ(R)
R
!
= Eθ {eπi(θ)}−µ1− 1
2
R
¶ eΨ(R), (A.36)
with eΨ(R) as in (5.12), and eΠi(R; ρ) as in (6.2). Note that eΠi( eR(ρ)) = eΠi( eR(ρ); ρ).
At cost of investment eρ(R) mandatory disclosing firms invest bR(eρ(R)) = bΨeρ(R)+bΨ in
information acquisition, and their expected equilibrium profit is bΠi ³ bR(eρ(R))´, where:
bΠi(R) = bΠiÃR; (1−R)bΨ
R
!
= Eθ {bπi(θ)}−µ1− 1
2
R
¶
(1−R) bΨ, (A.37)
with bΨ as in (4.4) and bΠi(R; ρ) as in (6.1), and bΠi( bR(ρ)) = bΠi( bR(ρ); ρ).
(i) It is easily verified that dbΠi ³bR(eρ(1))´ /dR = deΠi(1)/dR = −12deΨ(1)/dR > 0.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that:
d2bΠi ³ bR(eρ(1))´
dR2
− d
2eΠi(1)
dR2
= −pθ bDi(θ)∂2 eDi(θ; 1)∂r2 < 0. (A.38)
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Continuity of the expected profit functions then implies that there exists an R(i) <
1 such that for all R ∈ (R(i), 1): dbΠi ³ bR(eρ(R))´ /dR < deΠi(R)/dR. And sincebΠi ³ bR(eρ(1))´ = eΠi(1), this implies that bΠi ³ bR(eρ(R))´ > eΠi(R) for all R ∈ (R(i), 1).
Take R = eR(ρ), and note that eρ( eR(ρ)) = ρ. This implies that bΠi( bR(ρ)) > eΠi( eR(ρ))
holds for all ρ < bρ, where bρ ≡ eρ(R(i)), as is stated in part (i) of the proposition.
(ii) It is easily verified that bΠi ³ bR(eρ(0))´ = eΠi(0). Furthermore it is straightforward
to show that:
dbΠi ³ bR(eρ(0))´
dR
− d
eΠi(0)
dR
=
3bΨ2
2eΨ(0) + deΨ(0)dR − 12 eΨ(0)− pθ eDi(θ; 0)∂ eDi(θ; 0)∂r , (A.39)
Therefore d
³bΠi( bR(eρ(0)))− eΠi(0)´ /dR > 0 if C0 > 0, and the reverse holds if C0 < 0.
Continuity of bΠi( bR(eρ(R)))− eΠi(R) in R, implies that there is an R(ii) > 0 such that
for all 0 < R < R(ii): bΠi( bR(eρ(R))) > eΠi(R) if C0 > 0, and bΠi( bR(eρ(R))) < eΠi(R) if
C0 < 0. Define eρ ≡ eρ(R(ii)). Note that eρ( eR(ρ)) = ρ, and therefore bΠi ³ bR(eρ( eR(ρ)))´ ≡bΠi ³ bR(ρ)´. Hence we obtain the existence of a eρ < ∞, such that for all ρ > eρ:bΠi( bR(ρ)) > eΠi( eR(ρ)) if C0 > 0, and bΠi( bR(ρ)) < eΠi( eR(ρ)) if C0 < 0, which is stated
in part (ii) of the proposition. This completes the proof of proposition 6.¤
A.4 Conditions for Partial Disclosure, Proposition 7
Suppose eδ is the equilibrium disclosure rule. This disclosure rule gives equilibrium
R&D investments eDi(θ), eDi(∅) and eDi(θ) for firm i. Consider the two possible devia-
tions from the equilibrium disclosure rule. First, a firm with a low cost signal, Θi = θ,
can choose to disclose its information. Disclosing low R&D costs, results in invest-
ment bDi(θ) and profit 12θ bDi(θ)2 for firm i. Concealment of low costs gives expected
equilibrium profits 1
2
θ eDi(θ)2. Therefore deviation from the equilibrium disclosure rule
is not profitable whenever bDi(θ) ≤ eDi(θ). After solving for the equilibrium investment
from (A.5) we obtain:
eDi(θ)− bDi(θ) = W (1− p)(θ − θ)(1− ri)(1− rj)∆ZLD
(θ +∆)ZN
, (A.40)
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with
ZN =
£
p(1− p) (ri(1− rj) + (1− ri)rj) θ + p2(ri + rj − rirj)θ
¤
θ(θ2 −∆2) +
+(1− ri)(1− rj)
h
θ2
¡
E(θ)2 −∆2
¢
− (1− p)2rirj∆2(θ
2 −∆2)
i
(A.41)
≥ (1− ri)(1− rj)
h
θ2
¡
E(θ)2 −∆2
¢
− (1− p)2rirj∆2(θ
2 −∆2)
i
= (1− ri)(1− rj)
£
θ2
¡
p2(θ2 −∆2) + 2p(1− p)(θθ −∆2)
¢
+
+ (1− p)2(θ2 −∆2)
¡
θ2 − rirj∆2
¢i
,
which is clearly non-negative, and
ZLD = (1− p)(θ −∆) ((1− ri)θ − ri(1− rj)∆) + pθ(θ −∆). (A.42)
Note that ZLD ≥ 0 under condition (C.3).
Second, a firm with a high cost signal, Θi = θ, can choose to conceal its informa-
tion. After disclosing high costs, firm i receives profit 1
2
θ eDi(θ)2. After stating δ∗i = ∅,
high-cost firm i only changes firm j’s R&D investments when Θj = ∅. In that case
firm j’s investment changes from eDj(θ) to eDj(∅). Consequently firm i’s deviation
investment and profits are respectively:
θD∅i =W −
³
rj eDj(θ) + (1− rj) eDj(∅)´∆ and π∅i (∅|θ) = 12θ(D∅i )2. (A.43)
Therefore, when rj < 1 deviation from eδi(θ) is not profitable wheneverD∅i ≤ eDi(θ), oreDj(∅) ≥ eDj(θ). After deriving equilibrium investment eDj(∅) from (A.7) we rewrite
the inequality to:
eDj(∅)− bDj(θ) = Wpθ(θ − θ)ZHD
(θ +∆)ZN
≥ 0, (A.44)
where
ZHD = pθ(θ −∆) + (1− p)[(1− rj) (θ − ri∆) θ − (1− ri)(θ − rj∆)∆], (A.45)
and ZHD ≥ 0 gives condition (C.4). This completes the proof.¤
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